Personally I think it would be cool if it burned 1% of all incoming ETH. Permanently reducing total ETH supply seems like a good way to compensate HODLers for the market instability.
I stayed up last night and wrote a slightly technical walkthrough of the game theory for the smart contract solution.
For anyone taking the āoutside viewā and assuming that the argument must be wrong, Iām sympathetic! But so far I havenāt seen how. The crux is that Smart Contracts allow you to burn money in an ex post incentive compatible way. I actually wrote about this functionality here on this site a few months back.
If a smart contract can burn money, it can change the payoffs in a coordination game and commit to a certain strategy. This is a very old idea, and my claim is that smart contracts just enable this generally. I think I made a mistake in my earlier postsāgiven that this is a forum full of engineers --to be a little loose about what the smart contract needs to do. All it needs to do, in the game theory solution, is set your money on fire if you donāt win.
The only fundamental technical problem that I can see being relevant is the Oracle problem. But, the on-chain outcome of a certain identity/wallet/etc. winning the F3D jackpot seems like a very strong oracle. Of course, there are security issues, common knowledge issues, and ārepeated gameā issues as well so, while the solution is evidently there, it wonāt necessarily be easy to implement.
One final note per @ablebakercharlie I really donāt think dividends matter. Existing dividends matter, but once the game is solved nobody should purchase a new dividend. Given that the equilibrium solution requires the purchase of only one key, it seems that any new dividend would be out of the money.
I read your article in entirety and I plan on reading it several more times to make sure I grasp everything. I sincerely want to enjoy it and see its real life application, but I simply canāt. The most obvious reason is that despite my pleas, and those from the developers themselves, you have still shown disregard for the contract code at hand. At minimum, you could have taken the time to read the wiki as I suggested before.
What I propose is that, as far as I can tell, $12 million should be free for the taking for someone who can construct a suitable commitment contract.
Again, there is no singular winner. The amount you see on the screen when visiting FOMO3Dās site is not yours for being the last key purchaser before the clock hits 00:00:00. The purchaser will receive 48% of this amount. Itās clear I need to emphasize my point for anyone to comprehend it, so without further adoāplease read the wiki here.
If someone sufficiently funds a good commitment contract in F3D, nobody else can make any money. Clearly, you can only make money (in expectation) if the expected value of the prize is greater than the cost of the key you buy.
This is flat out false. I am not sure if you are intentionally overlooking the combined nature of capital appreciation with dividend reinvestment strategy (and referrals) or if you are simply ignorant to it. Let me pull on the string coming out of my back yet againā¦ there is no singular winner. If you are proposing that the purchaser who had his/her 1 ETH (which was the limit until 100 ETH was reached) confirmed as the first transaction of round one has not had their seed capital returned (even if your strategy was in place), I simply donāt have the words to express my shock. I am going to take a leap of faith and assume there is no way you can think that, so Iāll chalk it up to misspeaking or not having read the wiki. The math is extremely volatile due to individual strategy, but in this particular round, those who contributed x ETH at 10 ETH in the pot would reach their ROI when the pot increased to 500-1000 ETH. The pot is over 21000 ETH right now. Do you see where Iām going with this? I donāt want to share any more math as it could give an advantage to my competition and I donāt want that seeing as Iāve, ironically, āmade moneyā without winning the pot. This is not a theoretical questionā do you know the math the key price scaling as the pot grows or how individuals receive distributions as it does? If the answer to that is no, I beg you, without any inkling of math to back your claims, please do not spread fallacies such as guaranteeing a loss in capital. This is inappropriate to the highest degree.
We can make a line so long that itās not worth it for anyone. Youāve seen lines like this for things that are āfreeā, right? We can make a line so long that nobody should ever wait it in.
This is the first time I have ever seen a case of voluntary paralysis by a commitment device. I wonāt mince words hereā this is an atrocious analogy. By now Iām guessing you know what I am going to say; there is no singular winner and therefore this is not a binary event. In the case of free alcohol consumption, you either obtain it or you do not. I do agree with you there! However, it would not be applicable if while standing in this line, employees occasionally came around to offer their most eager attendees appetizers, shots, and balloon animals. Surely you would not suggest theyāve failed in their mission to receive a free drink because of their rewards along the way. Or if you are insistent on this still being a failure, surely they have āfailedā in a relative amount to their peers if some of them received no such rewards.
[any statement about a commitment device]
Itās very clear to me that you have an educational background involving economics or statistics, at minimum. I donāt mean this in a condescending way, but your article has a overtone of scholarly āteaching momentsā that is reminiscent of college textbooks, and thatās the reason for my guess. I donāt want to break the internet with the length of this response but I insist on this one point. Commitment devices and game theory are just that. If you are looking for an advantage, congratulations because you earned one. However, there is no mathematical law behind either of them, nor do they take into consideration any of the unavoidable elements from various outliers, especially those you see in a free market. Iāll say it like this; Cortes did not have only two options despite your insistence on it, nor did this guy Cuauhtemoc who Iāve admittedly never heard of. Suggesting otherwise is more naive than using Punnett squares to determine a personās life course.
Allow me to make a suggestion to avoid raising my blood pressure any more than I already have. I badly want to address more of your claims than I have so far, but for the sake of time, why not put 10 dollars into P3D, FOMO3D long version, or the upcoming FOMO3D quick version? Educate yourself by experience. Hell, make a commitment device into doing so. I appreciate all the time you have put into talking about FOMO3D but consider thisā I have never fished in my entire life, but I can unquestionably promise you, before writing an elaborate article explaining all the advantages, downsides, and luring tips for catching bass in Lake Okeechobee during the fall, I will have at least tried it once.
Edit: for anyone still reading this thread, there is still some code that is not open source and could, in principle, be an exploit. Check this articleāfirst linked upthread by @MicahZoltu --for details and updates.
Hi DaveyZ, thanks. Iāve done a good amount of reading on F3D. Most of the specifics just donāt seem to me to affect the core game (which is a coordination game as far as I can tell.) For instance, consider the idea that āthere is no single winnerā. The only prize Iām talking about is the prize that can be won by applying a commitment strategy right now. That is, I am talking about a strategy instituted at time t, where the prize is x, and cost of bidding on that prize is y. Iām saying there is a strategy that can win in those conditions. What Iām understanding you as saying is that:
- Prize x was produced by a previous process (at t-1, say) that has already made some people money.
- There is some number proportional to x (the 52%) that will be paid concurrently with prize x.
These things just do not matter to the commitment strategy as far as I can tell. The 52% might matter but Iām pretty sure it doesnāt. And if it does matter, please explain! I am certain that you know this game better than I do and I could absolutely be wrong here. I am trying to be crystal clear about my claims so people can understand and critique them.
Moving on, what I think youāre pointing to in your post about the āfirst purchaserā is 100% correct. Again though, this really just has nothing to do with what Iām talking about. This is probably my fault for not being clear but let me just say: nobody has created a commitment strategy thus far in F3D (or else by definition we would know about it.). And so my claims about ānot making any moneyā donāt apply as of right now. Iām sure plenty of people have made money and itās possible many more will. I genuinely have no opinion on this and Iām guessing this wouldnāt be the proper forum for that discussion anyway.
Finally, I feel guilty bumping this thread too much. If youāre up for taking this to twitter or medium or PMs Iām definitely down. However, Iām not really sure we disagree too much. If you want to just edit your previous post, Iām happy to edit this one by way of response to see if we can produce agreement that way.
Your argument is actually a predicted outcome of the long term that i fully designed the game around abusing. Your committal to winning the prize, while rationally guaranteeing the prize should be only won by you. Is actually the point of the game itself.
On that note however, weāre having some internal development discussions which bring us to an extremely heavy conclusion that Team JUST has forced an astoundingly complex and serious issue with ethereum and its platform as a whole. The burden of deciding what we do to alleviate this issue, the effect it would have on our players and what the extremely detrimental effect some of the internal conclusions we are reaching would have on the entire ethereum network if we let our suspicions come to pass, are monumentous.
We are daunted with the decisions and implications of this subject, would rather not make it public (yet), and would love to discuss it with core ethereum developers to confirm if they feel our fears are legitimate.
Feel free to contact me at
https://twitter.com/P3D_Bot (For verification of ID, we can move to any platform you feel necessary after)
To Confirm: itās not an isolated issue with Fomo3D, we are genuinely and completely worried that due to the format of our game we have guaranteed a pre existing condition that would cause colossal damage to the ETH network, will happen.
Is possible to create a contract that when a certain condition is met will create a new contract that in that constructor will call the Fomo3D contract with whatever it wants to bypass this verification - although this can only be done once per address.
The contract address that will be created is predictable, so miners could collude for this situation.
Yes but you need to make two separate transactions to buy a key and withdraw your earnings, and they both need to be made from the same address. Since the key purchase adds 30 seconds to the clock and the withdrawal can only happen after the clock reaches 0 this is impossible within a single constructor.
So it looks like the contract address is being spammed, potentially to stop anyone from buying keys: https://etherscan.io/address/0xdd9fd6b6f8f7ea932997992bbe67eabb3e316f3c
Turns out FOMO3d did not destroy Ethereum. A winner seems to have gotten the reward: https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe08a519c03cb0aed0e04b33104112d65fa1d3a48cd3aeab65f047b2abce9d508
There is an public Google Drive spreadsheet documenting transactions to FOMO3d: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1SMEY5Ei3LNc6_yR0VbF5d3OuRVavdtiAvjBRiYPaqLQ/edit#gid=0