Doesn’t this depend on having price feeds for the various ERC20s so that you know when to trigger liquidation calls for CDPs? My scheme does not depend at all on price feeds; it instead gets the same effect through incentivized preference revelation (ie. people participate in the “implied price feed” by choosing which asset they withdraw).
Such as basecoin.
Personally I’m not sold on basecoin specifically; it’s coins/bonds/shares model seems a bit iffy and unnecessarily complex. Particularly, there’s the instability that if the basecoin price goes down, then the mechanism pushing the price back up is to get people to buy basebonds, but basebonds basically just lock you into holding basecoin, and it’s not clear why people would want to do that; it seems too close to the old bitusd model (“we just say that the price of this token should be $1, and therefore people will buy if it’s under $1 and sell if it’s over $1 because they expect the self-fulfilling prophecy to be true”) for comfort. I am more of a proponent of seignorage shares: GitHub - rmsams/stablecoins
Another thing I have thought about is that in an economic model where you do not assume altruistic honesty or non-coordination, it’s not clear that makerdao has a higher security level, or even that it’s possible to achieve a higher security level, than seignorage shares. If the total discounted expected future profits of the scheme are lower than the amount of capital inside it, then the shareholders have the incentive to manipulate the price feed in order to siphon everyone’s money out. I’d be interested in seeing more detailed analysis on this.