A reminder that this proposal forces validators to select the builder with the highest bid block.
This means:
- validators in different legal jurisdictions to the dominant builder may be forced to power down rather than accept non-compliant blocks (same goes for crList)
- individual validators have little resistance if the dominant builder starts censoring
- makes cornering order flow, CaaS and unstaked hijacks etc harder to mitigate
- robs validators of their ability to choose altruistic forms of ordering that don’t frontrun or censor users (also making it likely that many will power down instead due to moral or legal concerns), which also represents a huge legal/regulatory risk to Ethereum
- if a dominant builder is also a large stake holder (eg: a pool), it prevents validators from choosing a different builder to mitigate further centralization
Some (but not all) of these problems go away if we first encrypt the mempool with this or some similar scheme, as do many other problems associated with PBS.