How to hard-fork to save most users' funds in a quantum emergency

Hi @vbuterin, thank you for the post.
About a year ago (almost to the day, actually!), my Ph.D advisor Or Sattath and I considered the same problem, and proposed a protocol employing similar ideas – in particular using the BIP-32 derivation process for post-quantum authentication.
A preprint is available on IACR /2023/362, and our work was also presented in the PQCSM2 workshop, slides available on their website (your policy does not allow me to post links).
We flesh out ideas very similar to yours and discuss how they can be composed. Our work also includes a careful analysis of the collision resistance of BIP-32 derivation paths, as well as a security analysis of the resulting signature scheme.
The greatest difference between our approaches, I think, is that we used Picnic signatures rather than STARKs. The advantage of our approach is that gas can be paid from the spent pre-quantum account itself, but of course, the disadvantage is that the signatures cannot be batched. We propose another approach to deal with signature sizes: a protocol where the signature must only be posted to the blockchain in case of fraud attempts.
We also describe a “quantum canary” mechanism for detecting quantum adversaries (inspired by Justin Drake’s cryptographic canaries) and provide some analysis of its game theory.
You might find that our work expands and complements the ideas presented in your post.

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