A few thoughts based on the discussion so far:
- MEV-Boost is a short term solution that bridges the gap to the permissionless block proposer / builder separation + mev smoothing solution which is preferred by everyone as it eliminates relays and therefore relay centralization. That being said, I expect multiple entities with existing reputations + large validators to offer relay services in the short term as it can be monetized + allows for reducing counter-party risk.
- Pursuing a solution which enables solo staker participation is critical to MEV democratization as it protects the ability for individuals to participate in receiving MEV rewards without the need to join a pool. I don’t see it being possible to scale up monitoring and enforcement of solo validators in a way that makes it reasonable to send payloads to validators in cleartext - if there was an automated way to evaluate solo validator behavior I could see this path being more plausible.
- Any MEV minimization / fair ordering system needs to be incentive compatible in order to succeed in the long run - I don’t see a path for these fair ordering experiments to gain adoption without either a) providing move revenue to validators, or b) introducing a consensus level change to the protocol. Solutions involving a) are already compatible with this proposal whereas solutions involving b) are outside the scope of the discussion in this post.