The amount of time the randomness is known before it is used is called the “lookahead”. People running the commodity ASIC have one epoch of lookahead. An attacker with hardware that is A_{max} times faster than the commodity ASIC has A_{max} epochs of lookahead.
Adaptive attacks (e.g. DoS, bribing, …) on proposers and committees is largely orthogonal to the randomness beacon for two reasons:
- Hardening against adaptive attacks is done with “private elections” (and hence private lookahead). There are various schemes (e.g. see my proposed scheme using ring signatures) that work regardless of the randomness beacon.
- Adaptive attacks (especially networking DoS attacks) are possible even for randomness beacons with small public lookahead (e.g. Dfinity’s scheme).
PoW and Algorand’s cryptographic sortition are two private election schemes but neither is unbiasable.