Quadratic Proof of Stake (qPos)
This discussion is highly conceptual and encourages the collective effort of the community. We formulise two quadratic-based consensus mechanisms that extend concepts related to Liberal Radicalism. Firstly, we define a more robust qPoS algorithm called Reputed Quadratic Delegated Proof of Stake (RQD-PoS), then, a more rudimentary algorithm is defined.
Introduction to Reputed Quadratic Delegated Proof of Stake (RQD-PoS)
Participants in the consensus have a reputation, whereby, their reputation grows the longer they participate in consensus decisions. Each participant stakes a certain amount of coins into the system and this will allow them to start generating reputation in the system. This reputation function is based on a sigmoid function that ensures that reputation is easily gained at the start, then progressively increases, which finally reaches an asymptotical plateau. This ensures that there is a balance in reputation, whereby, veteran community members do not have complete control over the system.
The reputation in the system acts as a mechanism to allocate voting power to each participant.
Now let’s formally define voting power in the system.
Voting Power of A Participant = Participant Reputation / Total Reputation in the system
Block Reward Mechanism
Block rewards that are generated are placed in a self-governed account that issues out the rewards in cycles (a cycle refers to an arbitrary period of time).
At each cycle, each participant in the consensus will be allocated a certain amount of voting power based on their reputation. They are then allowed to use this voting power to delegate votes based on concepts related to Quadratic Voting. This ensures that the n’th vote has a cost of
n. This means that even with a strong reputation, participants still have to pay a significant amount of votes to influence block reward allocation. Then, at the end of the cycle, the block rewards and fees are rewarded to the participants based on the votes allocated to each participant.
This would allow us to leverage the benefits provided by quadratic voting and reputation by ensuring that new users must gain reputation before being able to vote in consensus decisions.
- This is highly conceptual to encourage discussion from the community. It focuses on concepts related to Liberal Radicalism to figure out methods to construct consensus algorithms.
- Proves for Proof-Of-Reputation (Section 6.2), however, it’s important to note that the paper discusses computational power based reputation instead of actual stake.
- However, a quadratic-based consensus is still subjected to plutocracy, while, in theory, it is still more expensive than dPoS. This is a benefit provided by Quadratic Voting which ensures that n’th vote cost $n.
Additional Scheme: Quadratic Delegated Proof of Stake
It’s also possible to construct the same scheme without utilising reputation as a solution to gain voting power, also known as Quadratic Delegated Proof-Of-Stake (QD-PoS).
Some essential reads that are related to Liberal Radicalism and Proof of Reputation.
- Quadratic Payments: A Primer by Vitalik Buterin
- Developer incentivization: in-protocol contract author fee rebates by Vitalik Buterin
- RepuCoin: Your Reputation is Your Power by Jiangshan Yu, David Kozhaya, Jeremie Decouchant and Paulo Esteves-Verissimo
This section is an open discussion to encourage the collective community to solve issues related to Proof-Of-Stake based consensus.
- How do we solve plutocracy?
- Can enforce a wealth tax for the rich reputed miners to reduce economic disparity?
- What happens if there is a Universal Dividend from the reward pool?
I would love to chat with as many people as I can on solving/proposing a more robust and secure consensus mechanism, so don’t be afraid to drop me a message.