You seem to be suggesting that because the sandwich profits go to the LP instead of the searcher you have fixed the exploitation. But the outcome in this case is the same for the victim (or in fact worse as you admit).
Base layer developers don’t have to imagine every possible MEV opportunity. It’s very simple. Toxic MEV = miners reordering transactions for profit. There can be no satisfactory solution in the app layer until you have mitigated this power that miners have in the base layer.
There are broadly two solutions to MEV:
- fair order transactions - so miners can’t reorder
- encrypt the mempool - so miners can’t determine the advantages of reordering
Both mitigate the vast majority of toxic MEV without leaving dApp developers with a literally impossible task. This proposal opts for (2).
Sure, Uniswap could do more, but the app layer is not the layer that toxic MEV is happening in.
An encryption solution that prevents miners reordering is a generalized solution because the problem is fundamentally miners reordering.