Spam resistant block creator selection via burn auction

In the case of Ethereum where we have inflation already, burning sounds like a viable option.

Miners can compete for 3 ETH(X ETH) reward and burn Y ETH(less than computational costs) till it’s economically profitable, that would help with free-market price and inflation control.

How do you guarantee that every block creator participating in the auction is calculating based on the exact same set of txes? Or does this matter?

It seems that if transactors are selecting an creator based on their submitted burn, you’d want to standardize this.

How would one compare the capital efficiency of burn-based selection with lockup-based selection? Wonder (but don’t know!) if there’s a tradeoff between that and the fee monopoly risk you describe in pos/pow

We have to make sure transactions are shared with as many block creators as possible. If a single tx is not shared with eveyone it gives a single coordinator an advantage.

How would one compare the capital efficiency of burn-based selection with lockup-based selection? Wonder (but don’t know!) if there’s a tradeoff between that and the fee monopoly risk you describe in pos/pow

So with proof of stake you pay with the oppertunity cost of your eth. That has two probelms

  1. Everyone has a different value for opportunity cost
  2. You have to put much more capital down in order to get a reasonable opportunity cost. If you look at interest markets eth interest is about 0.01% per year. So you need to put alot of capital in order to get to meaningful amounts risked.
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Is this about a consensus algorithm that replaces PoS?
I’m curious that what is key difference of concept between this and Proof of Burn (PoB). In PoB, by burning the coin, nodes can prove their contribution/identity to the network, they can get the right to create block.