I would prefer to take it futher and have no auction at all (whether GPA or MEVA). In this situation, you keep the EIP 1559 base fee to reflect overall demand and mitigate DDOS, but eradicate the tip (thanks @barnabe).
It is way better for users because:
- no need to set/guess tx fees (which users dislike and which EIP 1559 is trying to address)
- visible guarantees of order execution (tx order is quickly visible in the content layer before entering the block)
- exploitative MEV is greatly reduced (simplest content layer=limited MEV auctions possible) or eradicated (enc/fair ordered content layer)
- low gas costs
The low gas costs observation is potentially huge and is only just occuring to me. I am actively researching it and would love to stimulate a debate around it.
Essentially, any auction (whether GPA or MEVA) creates MEV by allowing users to bid on transaction order. In doing so we are not only auctioning off tx execution, we are also auctioning off tx priority (which is far more valuable as the MEV crisis has shown).
It is this extra value that makes it worth attackers bidding up gas costs to extract MEV. Users that are not trying to extract MEV then have to raise their bids to compete with the very attackers that are exploiting them.
Put simply, not only do auctions corrupt transaction order, they also raise gas costs (I suspect by a lot- I aim to quantify this).
Yeah what I am proposing is a systemic change. High gas prices and MEV are systemic problems.