Interesting…thanks @BnWng! What you’re suggesting is a very novel idea! I think I understand better now…
We have two auctions, a buy-side auction for vote yes, and a sell-side auction for vote no. This is an opportunity to bid on the perceived value of the token in the event that proposal passes. If you support a proposal, that rationale is that you’ll want gov tokens. If you don’t support, you will want out so you aim to swap to dai/eth.
I have a few more thoughts that I’d like to share with you, though I am by no means a thought-leader in this space, so please take with a pinch of salt 
:
- Delegation / Voting power:
In the broader context of DeGov, having to send eth/dai to vote yes, and send governance tokens to vote no may conflict with vote delegation. Surely it’s better to have a token that handles voting, whether you choose to vote yes or no? At least then you can start delegating to other addresses, or other proxies.
It’s also impossible to tally who has ‘voting power’ in the DAO. Anyone with considerable ETH/DAI can sway a yes vote at any moment in time. Compound offers nice functionality in this regard, also check out Sybil & withtally.com
- Practicality question / Adoption:
Imagine you’re a core dev with 15% of total supply.
If I don’t support some proposal which I deem to be bad for the future of the DAO, in the best case scenario, I must vote no, then lose my tokens via the voting mechanism, and repurchase them back on the open market?
If I want to vote yes with my bags, I would need to sell my gov tokens on the open market for eth/dai, then vote. If it loses, I then have buy back the governance tokens in the event that I want to vote no in future. It’s quite a hassle! Not to mention potential liquidity issues…And also, creating an auction based mechanism creates a level of complexity for voting that I’m not sure would be conducive to protocol adoption.
- Is it an option?:
What’s the rational for an “option” that always exercises? It’s not really an option, if there is no option…Surely it’s better to see what the outcome of the proposal is before rewarding/punishing the voters?
…
On another note, it’s interesting to think about what kind of arbitrage opportunities could be created with your auction against the broader market…
Please forgive me if I have failed to understand the entirety of your model and/or have made some false assumptions. It’s a fairly complicated yet fascinating topic!