In the original TheDAO contract, it is assumed that TheDAO token holders
can vote for or against some proposal. The motivation for voting against
some proposal (as opposed to not voting at all), as I understand it, is to prevent spending TheDAO budget on some project you do not believe in and not willing to risk by your piece of the pie.
My question is in the following: Why not to divide TheDAO investors tokens
into separate “baskets”: separate basket for each proposal (as opposed to having
one big basket with all the tokens). If an investor wants to vote for a proposal, his tokens are put into the corresponding basket. The proposal under consideration can get only as much funds as the corresponding
basket contains. This step puts away the necessity to vote against some project,
because, by default, you are not risking by your tokens anyway?
Isn’t this solution also mitigates the so called “Majority robs minority” attack?
I’m pretty sure that there is a misunderstanding on my part regarding TheDAO business logic, I will appreciate any clarification.
TheDAO white paper: