What about implementing the solution using something like Execution Tickets in that proposers must pay for their slots in advance? The multiplication issue can be addressed by division, which I sketch below.
@mikeneuder one thing that your protocol doesn’t address is the different resources that you are trying to price here. CR temporary DA (e.g. rollups) != CR execution (e.g. on-chain/off-chain auction-type protocols) != ToB CEX-DEX arbitrage. If the proposers pay in advance and also state some fixed set of contracts/accounts that they will touch, Solana style, competition is removed, and the proposers who are paying for CR can broadcast their blocks well in advance to avoid any latency games.
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In the distinct blockspace scenario, by pricing CR-specific parts of a block different to ToB for example, we keep the linear censorship cost without introducing replication costs that the original proposal does.
Similar distinct blockspace idea proposed here.