given that sharding will very likely use KZG commitments and those require a trusted setup, with the Merge now on the horizon, let’s start talking about the setup.
my initial thoughts:
can we start collecting participants now to have a wide enough scale by the time the MPC ceremony is due?
can the setup incorporate the results from any previous trusted setups (like Zcash’s Powers of Tau, Aztec’s Ignition, Tornado Cash’s setup) to lower the chances of a reconstructed private key?
what is the greatest possible damage that someone with a reconstructed private key can do to a sharded Ethereum? can we parametrize the extent of this damage?
if every participant computes the MPC with the same client, the MPC has a single point of failure (which is, ironically, what an MPC is supposed to guard against). not least in the spirit of a multi-client Ethereum, I think this setup is critical enough to warrant multiple implementations on multiple CPU architectures.
There is the Perpetual Powers of Tau project that I believe Tornadocash used, although it’s been some months since that repository was updated so I’m unsure of the current status. It’s unnecessary to use an MPC for this, but it would be neat if someone made a contribution to it in an MPC using a heterogeneous set of computers they operated themselves.
Edit: Actually, I’m not sure which curve is planned to be used for the KZG commitment, I’m assuming BLS12-381 but PPoT is only BN254.
nice catch, this is what I hazily remembered. from what I see Tornado Cash did use a PoT ceremony but I’m not sure it’s perpetual. and yes, their curve was also BN254.
FYI, the repo you linked to doesn’t contain every contribution to that ceremony, the total was a bit over 1000.
even if sharding could use this ceremony, why do you think an MPC is unnecessary? I have great respect for many of the known PPoT participants, but Ethereum mainnet consensus is something the human civilization may rely upon for centuries. guarantees should be as solid as possible. community members deserve a chance to take part in the security of the cryptography, and there’s not much to lose by adding more participants. commissioning a single participant to set up computers is no different trust-wise from adding just a single participant.