Surely this undermines the basis of eth2 PoS consensus. How then does Ethereum secure itself against validators colluding to raise proposal rewards or even perform double spend attacks?
Correct me if I’m wrong, but I imagine your answer will be that it is not in validator self-interest because of the threat to their stake from a loss of confidence in the network.
What I want to show you is that the risks of full-block MEVA are comparable in severity, both in terms of gatekeeping centralization and damage to staked value, therefore (once these risks are understood and communicated) validators will similarly reject MEV collusion networks in favour of consensus content.
Perhaps I’ve got the game wrong, but eth2 PoS seems to make similar assumptions. It is arguably in the interests of the proposer to pay themselves a massive proposal fee (one-off game) but it is not in the interests of attesters to allow them to (repeated game).
Again, I think the same applies to a content consensus solution and that this will hugely benefit the security of Ethereum.
(Also, even if the content mechanism is perfectly colluded against, it degrades to having the same outcome as PBS, assuming Flashbots then run an informal market over it. It’s a bet to nothing with the advantage of reducing regulatory risk rather than increasing it. I suspect it is far easier to implement as well).