Special thanks to lots of people for this one. In particular: (i) the AZTEC team for introducing me to copy constraint arguments, sorting arguments and efficient batch range proofs, (ii) Dmitry Khovratovich and Justin Drake for the schemes in the Kate commitment section, (iii) Eli ben Sasson for feedback on FRI, and (iv) Justin Drake for general review. This is only a first attempt; I do expect this concrete proposal to be superseded by better schemes in a similar spirit if further significant thinking goes into this.
TLDR
We suggest replacing Merkle trees by magic math called âpolynomial commitmentsâ to accumulate blockchain state. Benefits include reducing the size of stateless client witnesses (excluding contract code and state data) to near zero. This post presents the challenges of using polynomial commitments for state accumulation and suggests a specific construction.
What are polynomial commitments?
A polynomial commitment is a sort of âhashâ of some polynomial P(x)
with the property that you can perform arithmetic checks on hashes. For example given three polynomial commitments h_P = commit(P(x)), h_Q = commit(Q(x)), h_R = commit(R(x))
on three polynomial P(x), Q(x), R(x)
then:
 if
P(x) + Q(x) = R(x)
you can generate a proof that proves this relation againsth_P, h_Q, h_R
(in some constructions one can simply checkh_P + h_Q = h_R
)  if
P(x) * Q(x) = R(x)
you can generate a proof that proves this relation againsth_P, h_Q, h_R
 if
P(z) = a
you can generate a proof (known as an âopening proofâ or âopeningâ for short) againsth_P
that the evaluation ofP
atz
is indeeda
You can use polynomial commitments as vector commitments similarly to Merkle trees. You can commit to P(x)
to commit to the vector of values P(1), P(2), ..., P(N)
and then use opening proofs instead of Merkle branches. A major advantage of polynomial commitments is that because of their mathematical structure it is much easier to generate more complicated kinds of proofs about them, as we will see below.
What are some popular polynomial commitment schemes?
Two frontrunners are Kate commitments (search for âKateâ in this article) and FRIbased commitments. You may also have heard of Bulletproofs and DARKs, which are alternative polynomial commitment schemes. To learn more about polynomial commitments there is a 3part series on YouTube (part 1, part 2, part 3 with slides here).
What are some easy use cases for polynomial commitments in Ethereum?
We can replace the current Merkle roots of block data (eg. of Eth2 shard blocks) with polynomial commitments and replace Merkle branches with openings. This gives us two big advantages. First, data availability checks become easy and fraudprooffree because you can simply request openings at a random eg. 40 of 2N
coordinates of a degreeN
polynomial. Noninteractive proof of custody also potentially becomes easier.
Second, convincing light clients of multiple pieces of data in a block becomes easier, because you can make an efficient proof that covers many indices at the same time. For any set {(x_1, y_1), ..., (x_k, y_k)}
define three polynomials:
 the interpolant polynomial
I(x)
that passes through all these points  the zero polynomial
Z(x) = (x  x_1) * ... * (x  x_k)
that equals zero atx_1, ..., x_k
 the quotient polynomial
Q(x) = (P(x)  I(x)) / Z(x)
The existence of the quotient polynomial Q(x)
implies that P(x)  I(x)
is a multiple of Z(x)
, and hence that P(x)  I(x)
is zero where Z(x)
is zero. This implies that for all i
we have P(x_i)  y_i = 0
, ie. P(x_i) = y_i
. The interpolant polynomial and the zero polynomial can be generated by the verifier. The proof consists of the commitment to the quotient plus an opening proof at a random point z
. Thus we can have a constantsize witness to arbitrarily many points.
This technique can provide some benefits for multiaccesses of block data. But the advantage is vastly larger for a different use case: proving witnesses for accounts accessed by transactions in a block, where the account data is part of the state. An average block accesses many hundreds of accounts and storage keys, leading to potential stateless client witnesses half a megabyte in size. A polynomial commitment multiwitness could potentially reduce a blockâs witness size down to, depending on the scheme, anywhere from tens of kilobytes to just a few hundred bytes.
So, can we use polynomial commitments to store the state?
In principle, we can. Instead of storing the state as a Merkle tree, store the state as two polynomials S_k(x)
and S_v(x)
where S_k(1), ..., S_k(N)
represent the keys and S_v(1), ..., S_v(N)
represent the values at those keys (or at least hashes of the values if the values are larger than the field size).
To prove that keyvalue pairs (k_1, v_1), ..., (k_k, v_k)
are part of the state one would provide indices i_1, ..., i_k
and show (using the interpolant technique above) that the keys and values match the indices, ie. that k_1 = S_k(i_1), ..., k_k = S_k(i_k)
and v_1 = S_v(i_1), ..., v_k = S_v(i_k)
.
To prove nonmembership of some keys one could try to construct a fancy proof that a key is not in S_k(1), ..., S_k(N)
. Instead we simply sort the keys so that to prove nonmembership it suffices to prove membership of two adjacent keys, one smaller than the target key and one larger.
once again
This would give similar benefits to using SNARKs/STARKs for âwitness compressionâ and related ideas by Justin Drake, with the added benefit that because the proofs are native to the accumulator cryptography rather than being proofs on top of the accumulator cryptography, removing orders of magnitude of overhead and the need for ZKPfriendly hash functions.
But this has two large problems:
 Generating a witness for
k
keys takes timeO(N)
whereN
is the size of the state.N
is expected to be on the order of2**30
(corresponding to ~50GB of state data) so it is impractical to generate such proofs in a single block.  Updating
S_k(x)
andS_v(x)
withk
new values also takes timeO(N)
. This is impractical within a single block, especially taking into account complexities such as witness updating and resorting.
Below we present solutions to both problems.
Efficient reading
We present two solutions, one designed for Kate commitments and the other for FRIbased commitments. The schemes unfortunately have different strengths and weaknesses that lead to different properties.
Kate commitments
First of all, note that for a degreeN
polynomial f
there is a scheme to generate N
opening proofs corresponding to every q_i(x) = (f(x)  f(i)) / (X  i)
in O(N * log(N))
time.
Notice also that we can combine witnesses as follows. Consider the fact that q_i(x)
is only a subconstant term away from f(x) / (X  i)
. In general, it is known that f/((X  x_1) * ... * (X  x_k))
is some linear combination of f/(X  x_1), ..., f/(X  x_k)
using partial fraction decomposition. The specific linear combination can be determined knowing only the x
coordinates: one need only come up with a linear combination c_1 * (x  x_2) * ... * (x  x_k) + c_2 * (x  x_1) * (x  x_3) * ... * (x  x_k) + ... + c_k * (x  x_1) * ... * (x  x_{k1})
where no nonconstant terms remain, which is a system of k
equations in k
unknowns.
Given such a linear combination we have something that is only a subconstant term away from f/((x  x_1) * ... * (x  x_k))
(as all original errors were subconstant, so a linear combination of the errors must be subconstant), and so it must be the quotient f(x) // ((x  x_1) * ... * (x  x_k))
, which is equal to the desired value (f(x)  I(x_1 ... x_k, y_1 ... y_k)) / ((x  x_1) * ... * (x  x_k))
.
One possible challenge is that for large states, a single realistically computable (eg. 100+ independent participants so if any one of them is honest the scheme is secure) trusted setup is not large enough: the PLONK setup for example can only hold ~3.2 GB. We can instead have a state consisting of multiple Kate commitments.
We make a single witness over many commitments as follows. To prove f_1(x_1) = y_1 âŚ f_k(x_k) = y_k, first let F = (f_1  y_1) * \prod_{i \ne 1} (X  x_i) + ... + (f_k  y_k) * \prod_{i \ne k} (X  x_k) (this is a linear combination of f_i's and 1 so the verifier can compute the commitment for this in real time). The witness is Q = \frac{F}{\prod_i (X  x_i)}; if Q is a polynomial then F actually has zeroes at those positions and so the f_i's have the desired values at their positions.
FRIbased commitments
We store the state in evaluations of a 2D polynomial F(x, y)
with degree sqrt(N)
in each variable, and we commit to evaluations of F
on a 4*sqrt(N)
by 4*sqrt(N)
square.
We store any values we care about at positions (x, x**sqrt(N))
so they all have unique x
coordinates. (Note that in many cases these positions will be outside the 4*sqrt(N)
by 4*sqrt(N)
square that we committed to evaluations on; this does not matter.)
To prove evaluations at a set of points x_1, ..., x_k
we construct a degreek
polynomial path(x)
whose evaluation at x_i
is x_i**sqrt(N)
.
We then create a polynomial h(t) = F(t, path(t))
, which contains all desired evaluations of (x_i, y_i)
and has degree k * (1+sqrt(N))
.
We choose a random 30 columns c_1 ... c_k
within the evaluation domain, and for each column query a random 30 rows. We commit to h
(with a FRI to prove that it actually is a polynomial), provide a multiopening for z_i = h(c_i)
and perform a FRI on a random linear combination on the quotients of the columns (R_i  z_i) / (X  path(c_i))
to verify that the claimed values of h(c_i)
are correct and hence that h(t)
actually equals F(t, path(t))
.
The reason for using 2 dimensions is that this ensures that we do not have to do any computation over all of F
; instead, we need only do the computation over the random 30 rows of F
that we chose (thatâs 30 * sqrt(N)
work), plus h
which has degree p * (sqrt(N) + 1)
, which is about p * sqrt(N)
work to make a FRI for. This technique can be extended to higher than 2 dimensions to push the sqrt
factor down to an even lower exponent.
Efficient writing
We get around the challenges associated with updating a single commitment containing the entire state by instead splitting the state into a series of commitments; you can think about it as being a âfull stateâ with a series of âcachesâ in front of it. The full state is larger but is updated less frequently, whereas the caches are updated more frequently:
 The block itself, with a âread witnessâ
(R_k(x), R_v(x))
and a âwrite witnessâ(W_k(x), W_v(x))
expressing the values to be written to the state. Note that we could setW_k = R_k
and computeW_v
at runtime.  The first cache
C1 = (C1_k(x), C1_v(x))
storing the last day of updates.  The second cache
C2
equal to the finalC1
of the previous day.  The full state
S = (S_k(x), S_v(x))
containing values older than 12 days.
The approach that we will use to encode the state into S
, C2
and C1
(each of which being represented by two polynomials, one storing keys and the other storing the corresponding values) is as follows. To read some key k
from the state we will read C1
, C2
, S
in that order. If C1_k(x) = k
for some x
then we read the corresponding value at C1_v(x)
. Otherwise, if C2_k(x) = k
for some x
then we read the corresponding value at C2_v(x)
. Otherwise, if S_k(x) = k
for some x
then we read the corresponding value at S_v(x)
. And k
is nowhere to be found in the evaluations of C1_k
, C2_k
or S
, then the key is not part of the state so we return zero.
Intro to copy constraint arguments
Copy constraint arguments are a key ingredient of the witness update proofs we will use; see here for more details on how a copy constraint argument works. Briefly the idea is to pick a random r
and generate an âaccumulationâ polynomial ACC(x)
where ACC(0) = 1
and ACC(x+1) = ACC(x) * (r + P(x))
. You can read the accumulator of the points in some range x....y1
by opening reading ACC(y) / ACC(x)
. You can use these accumulator values to compare these evaluations to some other set of evaluations as a multiset, without regard for permutation.
You can also prove equivalence of tuples of evaluations (ie. the multiset {(P_1(0), P_2(0)), (P_1(1), P_2(1)), ...}
) by setting ACC(x+1) = ACC(x) * (r + P_1(x) + r2 * P_2(x))
for some random r
and r2
. Polynomial commitments can be used to efficiently prove these claims about ACC
.
To prove subsets, we can do the same thing, except we also provide an indicator polynomial ind(x)
, prove that ind(x)
equals 0 or 1 across the entire range, and set ACC(x+1) = ACC(x) * (ind(x) * (r + P(x)) + (1  ind(x)))
(ie. at each step, multiply by r + P(x)
if the indicator is 1, otherwise leave the accumulator value alone).
In summary:
 we can prove the the evaluations of
P(x)
betweena
andb
is a permutation of the evaluations ofQ(x)
betweena
andb
(or some differentc
andd
)  we can prove that the evaluations of
P(x)
betweena
andb
is a subset of a permutation of the evaluations ofQ(x)
betweena
andb
(or some differentc
andd
)  we can prove that the evaluations of
P(x)
andQ(x)
is a permutation ofR(x)
andS(x)
, whereP > Q
andR > S
are the same permutation
In the next section, unless specified explicitly, we will be lazy and say "P
is a permutation of Q
" to mean "the evaluations of P
between 0
and k
are a permutation of the evaluations of Q
between 0
and k
for the appropriate k
". Note that the next section assumes we also keep track of a âsizeâ for each witness that determines which coordinates in any C_k
we accept; outofrange values of C_k(x)
of course do not count.
Map merging argument
To update the caches we use a âmap merging argumentâ. Given two maps A = (A_k(x), A_v(x))
and B = (B_k(x), B_v(x))
generate the merged map C = (C_k(x), C_v(x))
such that:
 the keys in
C_k
are sorted 
(B_k(i), B_v(i))
is inC
for every0 <= i < size(B)

(A_k(i), A_v(i))
is inC
for every0 <= i < size(A)
only ifA_k(i)
is not within the set of evaluations ofB
We do this with a series of copyconstraint arguments. First, we generate two auxiliary polynomials U(x), I(x)
representing the âunionâ and âintersectionâ of A_k
and B_k
respectively. Treating A_k, B_k, C_k, U, I
as sets we first need to show:
A_k â U
B_k â U
I â A_k
I â B_k
A_k + B_k = U + I
We preassume lack of duplication in A_k
and B_k
, meaning A_k(i) != A_j(j)
for i != j
within the range and the same for B_k
(because that was verified already in the previous use of this algorithm). Because I
is a subset of A_k
andB_k
we already know that I
has no duplicate values either. We prove lack of duplication in U
by using another copy constraint argument to prove equivalence between U
and C_k
, and prove that C_k
is sorted and duplicatefree. We prove the A_k + B_k = U + I
statement with a simple copyconstraint argument.
To prove that C_k
is sorted and duplicatefree, we prove C_k(x+1) > C_k(x)
across the range 0...size(C_k)
. We do this by generating polynomials D_1(x), ..., D_16(x)
and prove C(x+1)  C(x) = 1 + D_1(x) + 2**16 * D_2(x) + 2**32 * D_3(x) + ...
. Essentially D_1(z), ..., D_16(z)
store the differences in base 2**16
. We then generate a polynomial E(x)
which satisfies a copyconstraint across all of D_1, ..., D_16
along with f(x) = x
, and satisfies the restriction that E(x+1)  E(x) = {0, 1}
(a degree2 constraint over E
). We also check E(0) = 0
and E(size(C_k) * 16 + 65536) = 65535
.
The constraints on E
show that all values in E
are sandwiched between 0 and 65535 (inclusive). The copy constraint to D_i
proves that all values in D_i(x)
are between 0 and 65535 (inclusive), proving that it is a correct base16 representation, and thereby proving that C_k(x+1)  C_k(x)
actually is a positive number.
Now we need to prove values. We add another polynomial U_v(x)
, and verify:

(U, U_v)
at0...size(B)
equals(B_k, B_v)
at0...size(B)

(U, U_v)
atsize(B) ... size(A)+size(B)
is a subset of(A_k, A_v)
at0...size(A)
The intention is that in U
we put all the values that come from B
first, and then the values that come from A
later, and we use a samepermutation argument to make sure keys and values are copied correctly. We then verify that (C_k, C_v)
is a permutation of (U, U_v)
.
Using the map merging argument
We use the map merging argument as follows. Suppose there are BLOCKS_PER_DAY
blocks per day.
 if
block.number % BLOCKS_PER_DAY != 0
we verify(C1_k, C1_v) = merge((W_k, W_v), (C1_old_k, C1_old_v))
(merging the block intoC1
)  if
block.number % BLOCKS_PER_DAY == 0
we verify(C1_k, C1_v) = (W_k, W_v)
and(C2_k, C2_v) = (C1_old_k, C1_old_v)
(that is, we âclearâC1
and move its contents intoC2
)
Notice that C2
has a period of a full day during which it stays unchanged. We put up a reward for anyone to generate a proof that (S_k, S_v) = merge((S_old_k, S_old_v), (C2_k, C2_v))
; as soon as this proof is provided we update the commitment (S_k, S_v)
to the new values and reset (C2_k, C2_v)
to empty. If S
is not updated within that day then we delay the C1 > C2
transfer until it is updated; note that the protocol does depend on S
being updated fast enough. If this cannot happen, then we can solve this by adding a hierarchy of more layers of caching.
Recovering from bad FRI
In the FRI case, note that there is a possibility that someone generates a FRI thatâs invalid in some positions but not enough to prevent verification. This poses no immediate safety risk but could prevent the next updater from generating a witness.
We can solve this in one of several ways. First of all, someone who notices that some FRI was generated incorrectly could provide their own FRI. If it passes the same checks, it is added to the list of valid FRIs that the next update could be built off of. We could then use an interactive computation game to detect and penalize creators of bad FRI. Second, they could provide their own FRI along with a STARK proving that itâs valid, thereby slashing the creator of the invalid FRI immediately. Generating a STARK over FRI is very expensive, especially at the larger scales, but would be worth it, given the possibility of earning a large portion of the invalid proposerâs deposit as a reward.
And thus we have a mechanism for using polynomial commitments as an efficiently readable and efficiently writable witness to store the state. This lets us drastically reduce witness size, and also allows benefits such as giving us the ability to make data availability checks or proofs of custody on the state.
Future work
 Come up with a FRI proof that requires less than ~900 (more formally, less than square in the security parameter) queries
 Itâs theoretically possible to update Kate commitments quickly if you precompute and store the Lagrange basis (L_i(x) = 1 at x = w^i and 0 at other roots of unity). Could this be extended to (i) quickly update all witnesses, and (ii) work for a keyvalue map and not a vector?